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STATE OP UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : Case No. 970248-CA 
BRANDON DAVID WRIGHT, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OP APPELLEE STATE OP UTAH 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The instant action comes within the original jurisdiction of 
the Utah Supreme Court (Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (i) (1996)) and 
was poured over to this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-
2(4) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the defendant preserve his claim that the trial court 
used the wrong standard in denying the defendant's motion to 
reduce Wright's conviction from a first degree felony to a second 
degree felony# where no objection was made in the trial court. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This issue is unique to this Court and 
does not entail review of the district court's decision. 
2. Did the trial court use the correct statutory standard 
in denying the defendant's motion to reduce Wright's conviction 
from a first degree felony to a second degree felony. 
STANDARD OP REVIEW: A trial court has broad discretion in 
imposing sentence. State v. Sanwick, 713 P.2d 707, 708 (Utah 
1986); State V. Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 117 (Utah 1985). For 
questions of law, the reviewing court employs a correction of 
error standard, and for questions of fact a "clearly erroneous" 
standard applies. State v. Rhodes. 818 P.2d 1048, 1049-50 (Utah 
App. 1991). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(1) (1995) 
(1) If the court, having regard to the nature and 
circumstances of the offense of which the defendant was found 
guilty and to the history and character of the defendant, 
concludes it would be unduly harsh to record the conviction as 
being for that degree of offense established by statute and to 
sentence the defendant to an alternative normally applicable to 
that offense, the court may unless otherwise specifically 
provided by law enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower 
degree of offense and impose sentence accordingly. 
STATEMENT OP THE CASE 
In an information dated July, 1996, Brandon David Wright was 
charged with, Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony, Theft, a 
class B misdemeanor, and unlawful possession of drug 
paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor. R. 6-9. On November 15, 
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1996, Wright pled guilty to the Aggravated Robbery charge. The 
two misdemeanor charges had been dismissed at the preliminary 
hearing. R. 69. As part of the plea agreement, the State agreed 
to recommend that the defendant's conviction be sentenced as a 
second degree felony. R. 69. It was understood by all parties 
that the trial court had made no promises concerning how it would 
rule on such a motion to reduce. R. 71. 
On January 3, 1997, Wright was sentenced to serve a sentence 
of not less than five years to life at the Utah State Prison. R. 
97. The trial court denied the defendant's motion to reduce the 
sentence to a second degree felony. R. 96-97. Wright filed this 
appeal on January 31, 1997. R. 54-55. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Defendant pled guilty to aggravated robbery. In July 1996, 
Wright and another entered the victim's home for the purpose of 
robbing him. Defendant struck the victim repeatedly on the head, 
neck, and upper body, with a metal table leg. R. 7, 76-77, 92, 
98. 
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court denied the 
defendant's motion to reduce the sentence to that for a second 
degree felony. At no time did the defendant object in any manner 
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to the trial courtfs decision on this issue. The only statements 
made concerning this issue were: 
The Court: I believe the standard that Ifm required to 
consider in determining whether or not to sentence a 
person, who has pled guilty to a first degree, to a 
lesser sentence, that is a second degree felony, is 
there is some basis that is required by the interest of 
justice. And I can't find any in this case. 
The reasons that you suggest, Ms. Kreeck-Mendez, 
are rational reasons, but thatfs not the basis in the 
statute. So that motion is denied. 
Is there any legal reason I should not impose 
sentence? 
Ms. Kreeck-Mendez: Your honor, if you want a legal 
reason, I'd just like to make a record, that in the 
interest of justice that he can go to trial on this 
case, but for the State's recommendation, there is very 
likely there would have been a trial in this case. So 
I think the interest of justice are served by making 
some time for plea arrangements in these type of cases. 
Other than that, no. 
The Court: I still don't think that* rises to the level 
of something in the interest of justice, even when I 
take into account the mental health issues, and I 
recognize they're there. The motion is still denied. 
R. 96-97. 
In explaining why the defendant would not be granted 
probation, the trial court more fully explained how he viewed the 
nature and circumstances of the offense, and the history and 
character of the defendant. 
Mr. Wright, I'm obviously not interested in considering 
you for the privilege of probation for a number of 
reasons, not the least of which is the magnitude and 
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the degree of severity of this offense. You're 
probably extremely lucky Mr. Lee [the victim] is not 
dead. You seriously beat him. It's no excuse that you 
were high on drugs. You presented at that point in 
time, and I believe continue to present, until you get 
these problems resolved, a serious risk to this 
community. And I don't intend to put the community to 
further risk with this type of conduct. It's 
absolutely unacceptable. And there is a substantial 
penalty that runs with this type of conduct. If you 
are going to hurt somebody else to the degree you did 
in this case then there is a serious debt to pay to 
society. And that is what you are going to have to do. 
It is unfortunate because, obviously, if you wrote 
the document, which I believe you did, that you just 
read, you're intelligent and you're bright, you are 
articulate and it just wastes a good portion of your 
life, before this. And now, because of this, you are 
going to lose at least the next five years. 
You can either make it work or just fall back in 
the same things you did. The first time you served 
your entire sentence. They tried you on parole and you 
didn't do what you were supposed to. You ran; you 
violated parole, so you served the full five years. 
Most people spend a few months out there on a zero to 
five commitment, but not you. They had to extradite 
you back to Utah after you fled, and so you served the 
entire five years. That's probably four years longer 
than you had to because you couldn't abide by the 
rules. 
And there are maybe some mental health issues that 
I intend to attach to this commitment. The 
recommendation that the Board of Pardons needs to look 
at these issues, if they want to look at them, they can 
get them. 
R. 98-99. 
SUMMARY OP ARGUMENT 
The issues raised by the defendant are raised for the first 
time on appeal. They were not preserved in the trial court by a 
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specific objection. Nor was the trial court's decision plain 
error. 
Defendant's claim that the trial court had a very wide 
discretion to grant his motion to reduce the conviction and 
sentence is contrary to the plain language of the statute. The 
statutory standard permits such reductions only when the regular 
sentence would be unduly harsh. The trial court applied the 
correct standard and did not abuse its discretion in denying the 
motion to reduce. 
ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO PRESERVE HIS 
CLAIMS AND CANNOT RAISE THEM FOR THE FIRST 
TIME ON APPEAL 
Wright claims, for the first time on appeal, that the trial 
court applied the wrong standard in denying the defendant's 
motion to reduce his sentence. 
in Espinal v, Salt Lake City Bd» pf EdvtCw 797 p.2d 412 
(Utah 1990), the plaintiffs raised a constitutional claim for the 
first time on appeal. In refusing to consider that claim, the 
Utah Supreme Court explained: 
Appellants1 first claim is that the 
realignment violated article I, section 7 of 
the Utah Constitution by denying them the 
liberty to control their children's 
education. This claim was raised for the 
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first time on appeal. With limited 
exceptions, the practice of this Court has 
been to decline consideration of issues 
raised for the first time on appeal. We 
therefore do not address this claim. 
Id. at 413 (citations omitted). The limited exceptions to the 
general rule referred to in Espinal deal with cases in which the 
appellate court is persuaded that "the trial court committed 
plain error or exceptional circumstances exist in this case." 
State v. Sepulveda. 842 P.2d 913, 917-18 (Utah App. 1992) 
(footnote omitted). See also State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 853 
(Utah 1992); State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781 (Utah 1992). 
It was the duty of the defendant to raise any and all claims 
in the trial court. Wright's claim that the trial court used the 
wrong standard in considering his motion to reduce sentence was 
not preserved in the trial court, and should not be considered on 
appeal for the first time. 
This is especially so in the circumstances of the present 
case. The defendants claim is based solely upon his 
interpretation of what the trial court said in denying the 
motion. If the trial court had been aware that the defendant 
believed it had used the wrong standard, Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
would have had an opportunity to explain exactly what standard he 
was actually using. Because the trial court was not given such 
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an opportunity, it is now impossible to determine exactly what 
Judge Hanson meant by the challenged words and what standard the 
trial court applied. 
The mere fact that a motion to reduce was made did not in 
some manner preserve the claim that the trial court used the 
wrong standard in considering the motion. Nor did the fact that 
the motion to reduce the sentence takes up 12 pages of 
transcript. Aplt. Br. at 12. Issues arising from sentencing are 
subject to the "longstanding rule of appellate review" that the 
failure to raise an issue in the trial court "precludes the issue 
from being raised for the first time on appeal." State v. 
Bywaterr 748 P.2d 568, 569 (Utah 1987). A specific objection 
needed to be made to the particular error that the defendant 
believed the trial court had committed. Even a general objection 
to the sentence has been held to be inadequate to preserve issues 
for appeal. State Y» Elm, 808 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah 1991). 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S CHALLENGED COMMENTS DO 
NOT CONSTITUTE PLAIN ERROR 
Defendant also claims that, based upon his interpretation of 
the trial court's comments, the trial court committed plain error 
in using the wrong standard in considering the motion to reduce 
sentencing. Defendant claims that the "[f]ailure to exercise 
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'very wide discretion1 over the matter should be treated as plain 
error, since it is 'absolutely require [d] ! under the case law." 
Aplt. Br. at 13. 
This Court has recently explained that to succeed on a plain 
error claim, a defendant must demonstrate three points: first, 
that an error exists, second, that the error should have been 
obvious to the trial court, and third, that the error was 
harmful. State v. Morrison. 937 P.2d 1293, 1296 (Utah App. 
1997). Where, as here, no federal constitutional right is 
implicated, "the test used for determining an error's harmfulness 
is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that absent the error 
a different result would have occurred." State v. Emmett, 839 
P.2d 781, 784 (Utah 1992). 
To support his claim of plain error, defendant relies on 
State v. LJPSky, 608 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Utah 1980). Lipsky 
explained that a trial court exercises discretion in exercising 
the "wide variety of alternatives" available to the court in 
sentencing a criminal defendant. Id. These alternatives 
include; prison sentence, imposing a fine, reducing the sentence, 
probation, disqualification from public or private office, 
suspended sentence, consecutive or concurrent sentences, and 
restitution. But Lipsky did not hold that the standard to be 
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followed by the trial court in determining whether or not to 
reduce a sentence was a very wide discretion as claimed by the 
defendant. 
No plain error has been shown because the trial court's 
comments are similar in nature to the actual statutory standard 
imposed upon the trial court. 
If the court, having regard to the nature and 
circumstances of the offense of which the 
defendant was found guilty and to the history 
and character of the defendant, concludes it 
would be unduly harsh to record the 
conviction as being for that degree of 
offense . . . may . . . enter a judgment of 
conviction for the next lower degree of 
offense and impose sentence accordingly. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(1) (1995). 
Clearly the statute does not endow a very wide discretion, 
but rather requires a weighing of the crime, the defendant, and 
the statutory punishment, to determine if the imposition of the 
statutory punishment would be unduly harsh. It was not plain 
error for the trial court to not consider itself to have almost 
absolute discretion as to whether or not to reduce the sentence. 
Given the language of the statute, the defendant has failed to 
show that the trial court committed plain error in not believing 
itself to have the very wide discretion claimed for it by the 
defendant. 
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Even if this Court were to assume, as does the defendant, 
that the words of the trial court demonstrate it not only used 
the wrong standard, but committed plain error, the defendant has 
failed to show that he has been harmed by the alleged error. 
There has been no showing that, absent the alleged error, a 
different result would have occurred. 
The trial court gave a full explanation of why the defendant 
would not be placed on probation. R. 98-99. Judge Hanson found 
that both the nature and circumstances of the offense, and the 
history and character of the defendant led him to deny probation. 
These same facts led the trial court to deny the motion to reduce 
the sentence. The defendant has failed to demonstrate that, 
absent the alleged error, a different result would have occurred. 
The only reason given by the defendant in opposing the trial 
court's denial of his motion to reduce was that the reduction 
should be granted because the defendant had entered a plea 
agreement and not gone to trial. R. 97. This does not even go 
to the statutory test for deciding whether or not a sentence 
should be reduced. No reasonable likelihood of a different 
result has been shown. 
Defendant has failed to show that the trial court committed 
plain error, and therefore the defendant cannot raise his 
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challenge to the trial court's sentence for the first time on 
appeal. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT USED THE CORRECT 
STANDARD IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
REDUCE SENTENCE 
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in using the 
phrase "in the interest of justice" in explaining why it was 
denying the defendant's motion to reduce his sentence. Defendant 
claims that the trial court had very wide discretion in making 
this decision. Defendant's position is contrary to the explicit 
language of the statute in question. 
If the court, having regard to the nature and 
circumstances of the offense of which the 
defendant was found guilty and to the history 
and character of the defendant, concludes it 
would be unduly harsh to record the 
conviction as being for that degree of 
offense . . . may . . . enter a judgment of 
conviction for the next lower degree of 
offense and impose sentence accordingly. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(1) (1995). 
The statute authorizes the court to reduce the conviction 
and the sentence one degree only when, based upon a review of the 
crime and the defendant, the statutory sentence would be "unduly 
harsh." Utahfs statute is based on the Model Penal Code. Model 
Penal Code §6.12, 10 U.L.A. 513 (Master Edition). This "unduly 
harsh" standard was never meant to give broad discretion to the 
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trial court in reducing sentences, but rather to permit the court 
to correct those inevitable cases where a conviction and sentence 
in accordance with the statute would seem unduly harsh to the 
court. State v. Megarcrel. 673 A.2d 259, 264 (N.J. 1996). 
Unduly is defined as "1. Excessively: immoderately. 2. 
improperly: wrongfully." Webster's II New Riverside University 
Dictionary 1259 (1988). In Estate of Sarabia. 270 Cal. Rptr. 
560, 562 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990), the court affirmed a supplementary 
jury instruction which defined unduly as "generally it is 
something that's unwarranted, excessive, inappropriate, 
unjustifiable or improper." 
If the word unduly is given its normal meaning, it becomes 
clear that the trial court did not have a very wide discretion to 
reduce the sentence and conviction in this case. Instead, the 
statutory authority to reduce a conviction and sentence is meant 
for those few cases where, given the particular facts of the 
matter, the punishment imposed by the legislature would be 
excessively, unjustifiably, or wrongfully harsh. 
While the trial court appears to have used the phrase 
"interest of justice" as a simpler and shorter means of 
describing this test, there is no proof in the record that the 
trial court failed to use the statutory test appropriately. 
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In State v. Nelson. 740 P.2d 835, 842 (Wash. 1987), the 
court explained that "[i]mposing a penalty which is within the 
standard range but unduly harsh, considering the circumstances of 
a case, does not f [p]romote respect for the law by providing 
punishment which is just." That is not the circumstance in the 
present case. The defendant failed to convince the trial court 
that a five to life sentence would be unduly harsh given the 
nature of the crime and the charactei of the defendant. While 
the trial court has discretion to weigh the statutory factors, it 
does not have a very wide discretion to ignore them. 
The unduly harsh standard permits the trial court, in 
exceptional cases, to reduce the sentence so as to avoid a 
sentence that would be wrongfully harsh. This was not such a 
case. The trial court's decision to deny the motion to reduce 
should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
On the basis of the foregoing, the trial courtfs sentence of 
Wright should be affirmed and the defendant's request for remand 
for resentencing be denied. 
14 
ORAL ARGUMENT AND A PUBLISHED OPINION NOT 
REQUESTED BY THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE 
The State of Utah does not request oral argument and a 
published opinion in this matter. The questions raised in this 
appeal are not such that oral argument or a published opinion are 
necessary, though the State of Utah desires to participate in 
oral argument if such is held by the Court. 
Respectfully submitted this // of August, 1997. 
# 
BRENT A. BURNETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee 
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